
EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE OF ALLAMEH TABATABA'I'S ARGUMENTS ON SOUL-IMMATERIALITY

Seyyed Hatam Mahdavinoor¹ and Mohammad Reza Aram^{2*}

¹ *Islamic Azad University, Department of Islamic Theology, Yadegar-e-Imam Khomeini (Rah) Shahre-rey Branch, Khalig-e Fars High Way, Tehran, Iran*

² *Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Faculty of Law, Theology and Political science, Department of Qur'anic Sciences and Hadith, Daneshgah Blvd, Simon Bulivar Blvd, Tehran, Iran*

(Received 25 November 2022, revised 15 June 2023)

Abstract

One of the most important arguments of philosophers dealing with divine problems is to demonstrate the immortality of man, which requires proving the immortality of the soul. Allameh Tabataba'i (1904-1981) is one of the great contemporary philosophers who has offered new arguments for the immortality of the soul as well as a new explanation for arguments of the past. Given the position of this great philosopher among Muslims, it is necessary to examine his views in this regard. This study, evaluation and criticizes Allameh Tabataba'i's arguments on immateriality of soul. The arguments of Allameh for Soul-Immateriality are of two types. In the first category based on immortality of knowledge, he argues for the immortality of soul, and since the immortality of knowledge is not self-evident, various cases have been put forward for the immortality of it. His arguments are: a) impression of large objects in small objects, b) the indivisibility of knowledge, c) consistency of forms of knowledge (mental imagery) despite changes in nerves and cells, and d) perception of continuous quantities, e) perception of universal ideas. In the second category, special human characteristics are used to prove the incorporeity of the soul. Their arguments are based on the fact that man has abilities that are not material, so there must be something in man that is not found in matter. His arguments are: a) self-awareness of the soul, b) do not neglect yourself, and c) changing body cells and stabilizing the soul. Today, with the help of new technologies, many human-specific features have been realized in the machine, and as a result, the arguments based on these features are invalidated.

Keywords: Allamah Tabataba'i, immortality, soul

*Corresponding author, e-mail: aram.mohammadreza@yahoo.com, tel.: +989123238418

1. Introduction

The difference in the way man exists has been debated among philosophers from long ago. a) Some philosophers consider man to be in two realms: a soul abstracted from matter and the material body. Other philosophers consider man to be one-dimensional. b) Some of them only consider man as body, and c) regard him as the soul. The differences between the mentioned three groups have not been resolved after many years. Each group has argued in their favour and against the other group. Sometimes the advancement of Science was to the benefit of one group and to the detriment of another.

There are three philosophical schools in the Islamic world: a) Masha school, which is Ibn Sinā and his followers. The main feature of this school is the emphasis on rational arguments in Philosophy. b) Ishrāq School, which is Suhrawardi and his followers. The characteristic of this school is the emphasis on intuition in cognition. c) The sublime (transcendental) wisdom that Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers are. Mullā Ṣadrā combined the two previous methods. Among Muslims, most philosophers of the three schools believe in the immateriality of the soul. Allameh Tabataba'i is one of the neo-Ṣadrā philosophers that has presented several arguments to prove the immateriality of the soul. According to Allameh Tabatabai, the soul (نفس) is a substance that is separated from matter by nature, but it belongs to it in order to act [1]. In this definition, substance means the nature that when it is realized, it is not included in the subject at all, or if is placed in a subject, that subject is such that it needs this essence [2]. Spirit (روح), as it is derived from the word, is the source of life that enables the animal to feel and move voluntarily [3]. He also uses soul and spirit in humans instead of each other. Soul-immateriality means that soul has not properties of matters like divisibility, sensibility, or lack of perception.

Allameh Tabataba'i's arguments on the immateriality of the soul can be divided into two types: rational and narrative. The most important basis of rational arguments is distinction between man and matter; that is, man performs some actions that the body is unable to perform, so it is not material.

In the world of Islam, immateriality (*Tajarrood*) is considered on two levels. a) Purgatory or imaginary immateriality in which the being does not have some matter but has shape, colour and size. b) Intellectual immateriality, where existence even have not shape, colour and size. These two types are considered in human immortality.

Today, because of progress in artificial intelligence, machines perform actions that humans can do. Therefore, if it can be shown that the machine is able to perform all human functions, rational arguments of proponents of immateriality lose their validity.

In this study, we have challenged Allameh Tabataba'i's rational arguments about the reasons for immortality of soul and identified material examples of human characteristics that were thought to be unique to man and that the matter could not do. Of course, it should be noted that the rejection of the reason does

not indicate the denial of the claim but rather provides evidence to prove the materiality of the soul.

2. Review and critique of arguments on immateriality of the soul

The arguments given by Allameh Tabataba'i for immateriality can be categorized as follows: a) Arguments based on the immateriality of knowledge. In the Islamic world, *Ilm* is used in different meanings, which include: every types of perception or consciousness, knowledge, Science and scientific discipline. In this article, knowledge is considered as a translation of *Ilm* in meaning of the first sense; Allamah Tabataba'i believe that all kind of perceptions are immaterial. b) Arguments based on special human characteristics. We will discuss and criticize two types of argument.

2.1. Arguments based on the immateriality of knowledge

In the Islamic world, knowledge is considered to have different degrees/levels: a) sensual perception (knowledge), which is a partial perception and is obtained through the senses, and this perception exists as long as the sense is connected to an external entity. b) Imaginary perception (knowledge) which is a partial perception and when the connection of the senses with the external entity is interrupted, forms. c) Intellectual perception (knowledge) that man understands the generalities. In the perception process there are three objects: knower, known, knowledge. If the known be an external object then the known and the knower are separate. Knowledge is created or shaped in the soul. Islamic philosopher referred to knowledge as mental existence and known as external existence.

Some of the arguments for immateriality of the soul mentioned by Allameh Tabataba'i are based on the immateriality of knowledge. For some philosophers who consider only intellectual perception to be immaterial, this argument is generally not applicable to human beings who have not achieved a general perception.

For further explanation, it should be noted that before Mullā Ṣadrā, most philosophers believed that imagination knowledge is a physical process and action, and they present arguments for it. For example, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in *Al-Mubahis al-Mashre'iyah* has given three arguments for this claim [4].

Mullā Ṣadrā has considered all level of knowledge as immaterial. According to his own principles, Mullā Ṣadrā considers the soul as an example of the Supreme Being in aspect of essence, attribute and action. To a certain extent, this soul creates beings only in itself, and at a higher stage, it can also develop beings outside the soul and create external existence [5]. On the other hand, the perceptive power of the soul and its perceptual data also have a kind of immateriality, in such a way that the intellect and its assets are completely independent of matter, so that the power of senses and imagination as well as

their perceptual forms are immaterial but not to the extent of intellect immateriality [5, p. 313]. If we accept that all level of perception is immaterial, then the soul that is its place will also be immaterial; however, the minor premise is not obvious and must be proved. To demonstrate the immateriality of knowledge, Allameh Tabataba'i has given several arguments that are examined below.

2.1.1. Impression of large objects in small objects

Allameh Tabataba'i mentions this argument in his book titled *Usul-i falsafeh va ravesh-e-realism* (The Principles of Philosophy and Method of Realism) [6] for the immateriality of perception, and this argument can be clearly seen in the works of past philosophers. This argument is based on the observation that in material objects, the larger body does not fit into the smaller one. Therefore, if we see where a larger body is placed in the smaller one, then this two things should not have material properties. This case is the tenth argument of Fakhr al-Razi in *Mabahith al-mashriqiyya fi 'ilm al-ilahiyyat wa-'l-tabi'iyyat* (Eastern Studies in Metaphysics and Physics) and the second reason of Mullā Ṣadrā in *Hikmat al-Muta'alyahfi-l-asfar al-'aqliyya al-arba'a* (The Transcendent theosophy in the Four Journeys of the Intellect) for immateriality. Allameh Tabataba'i proves this with his impression of a 12x8 cm square photo and says: "Never a fifteen-kilometre view with its many contents and different lengths, widths, depths and distances as well as various physical and mental properties found in it can fit in a page with 12 cm by 8 cm dimension" [6].

This photo shows only the scene; otherwise, there is nothing on the paper except for coloured spots. Allameh meant to mention this example in the article that it is impossible to adapt and impress the big to the small. Explaining this viewpoint, Allameh says: "We can never accept that this vast view of the world with all its astonishing features is connected with all the lines, surfaces, and bodies of a single, smooth piece of matter that appears to us in a piece of tiny neural or cerebral matter with separate and dense components, which is finally smaller than our whole body, and on the other hand, the differences we see in the senses when using them will not allow us to say that the reality of the material world outside of us is in its place. We perceive and we achieve. Therefore, this perceptual form is neither substituted in our matter nor in the matter outside of us." [6, p. 92-93]

2.1.1.1. Critique

This argument is not sufficient for proving the immortality of perceptual forms because in smart machines, the big one is printed in the small one. If we take the development of some relationships as an argument, as Allameh says, then an intelligent machine with optical sensors can take pictures of environment such as a mountain, a forest, and everything else. This action is like that of a

man seeing with his eyes. A smart machine can detect a lot of information that humans are unable to comprehend in a sensory image. If the purpose of perception is to recognize these relationships and make decisions based on them, then in case the image is given to a smart car, it will have higher impressions than humans do. Of course, such perceptions require complex software programs. It may even recognize emotional state of a human, for example, it tell by his face that he is angry or happy.

Allameh's response to criticism: Allameh Tabataba'i himself raises these objections and says in response: Our evidence, together with the affirmative relations and the aforementioned thought, forms a unit and creates something that is imaginable, and this notion of ours does not correspond to the general properties of matter [6, p. 99].

Review and critique of Allameh Tabataba'i's answer: Allameh actually explains the difference between a photograph and human perception. There are only a number of points in the photo and it does not recognize any relationship. But in addition to having that information, humans also understand relationships. In response, we say: What is the meaning of unity? What is perceived to constitute the affirmative and imagined relations of a unit? Does it mean operational thinking that has extracted these relationships? Does unity mean simplicity or it indicates not attributing this thought to another person? Or is it all integrated? Such unity can also be recognized in intelligent systems. An intelligent system with powerful applications captures images, not another computer. If we want to accept the multiplicity of components of this perception in intelligent systems, that is, to distinguish between image and acknowledgment and perception, etc., we can also recognize such a distinction in human perception. Separate the face from perception and from acknowledgment as they do in logic.

One of the reasons that Muslim philosophers have given such an argument for immateriality is that they believe in the quiddity union between mental existence and objective existence. They said that when we perceive an object we recognize two things: Existence and Quiddity. Obviously, the arguments of Muslim philosophers are not enough for the quiddity union of mental existence and objective existence [7]. If we do not accept the quiddity unity against regularity, these arguments will also lose their value.

In addition, the same argument can be made for intelligent systems that today is common. What does the intelligent system understand when it perceives a tree? The image or its quiddity? One has to ask what is the difference between the perception of an intelligent system and human perception, in which we say that the quiddity of an object comes to mind; however, in the perception of an intelligent system, we say that the image of the object is understood, not its quiddity. If we put a sensor for a smart system with a camera, with which it can obtain information about itself, can it detect what it sees by processing this information? The same is true when man sees something. It may be said that the computer does not recognize itself, but the intelligent man has given it a

program that distinguishes things. We say: How do you know a human is not a very intelligent computer that is programmed? It is not irrelevant to discuss where this program came from because the issue now is the immortality of human soul. Two modes can be considered here: the highly intelligent creature created a very intelligent computer called man, or this intelligence was developed through evolution. The first arguments is from theists who do not believe in immortality of the soul and the second is from materialists. In any case, this argument is not enough to account for the immortality of soul.

One might say that man can process that image and derive intellectual concepts from it, meaning that it understands the universal ideas and that the intelligent system is unable to do so. We provide the answer to this question in the perception of universal ideas.

2.1.2. The indivisibility of knowledge

Another argument of Allameh Tabataba'i in proving the immortality of perception/knowledge is that the knowledge is not dividable. Knowledge cannot be divided, and whatever is not dividable is not material [6, p. 99]. Allameh says: "Spiritual properties such as will, discouragement, love, hate and knowledge do not possess general properties of matter such as division and evolution" [6, p. 101]. The major of proposition of argument is clear; however, the minor of proposition of it needs to be proven. What does it mean that science is indivisible? That is, one idea cannot be turned into two ideas? For example, the idea of a tree cannot be halved. Allameh says: "Every material thing, whether substance or accidental quality, is divisible; in such a way that the total no longer is present and also every material existence has a gradual essence whose existence is bound" [6]. The same can be done in the intelligent system if the purpose is to divide the image into two images and keep the other image. In addition, the rational concept is divided into genus and differentia. To escape from this problem, Hajj Mullā Hādī Sabzavāri says that the human soul perceives rationalities such as unity and cause as well as other means that cannot be divided in any way [8]. To avoid this problem, some people base their understanding on general concepts such as love and enmity and say that these concepts are indivisible [9].

Understanding universal ideas has been cited as another argument for immortality, which we will examine separately. Here, matters in which division is impossible such as God and the simple thing are examined. They have argued for proving their claim with the non-division knowledge of indivisibles: We have knowledge of indivisibles. The knowledge belonging to this thing needs a place. If we can divide the knowledge that we have, then each of those types is either knowledge or not knowledge. If the components are not knowledge, then the sum of those components is not knowledge. If all these are kinds of knowledge, they will probably be bound to this knowledge because knowledge will not be without bounding. Science is always knowledge of something. Two

cases may arise here. First, if the belonging of each of those knowledge pertains to the knowledge before the part, then the part will be equal to the total. The second case, which belongs to each component, is a part of that simple being. In this case, it is not a simple object and is composed of components, which is contrary to assumption [10]. Therefore, knowledge of simple matters is indivisible and is immaterial, because every division is the property of matter, so the soul is immaterial; otherwise, it must be divided because every material is divided and its object, which is knowledge, must also be divided [11].

2.1.2.1. Critique

Can we recognize everything that is not divisible as immaterial? Islamic philosophers believe in Aristotle's genus and sectional system. Some goods are genus and some are section. That is, the goods are arranged on top of each other and form a chain that ascends from the particular genus to the general one. Inevitably, we have to reach a genus that is not higher than that genus. These goods are called categories that are simple. Some of these categories are material and indivisible. Is knowledge of a simple thing simple, or is human knowledge of simple things a set of negation and proofs? Because Allameh and the followers of exalted theosophy believe in quiddity unity of the known in essence (mental existence) and the known by accident (external existence), they must verdict on simple matters with the simplicity of knowledge.

The intelligent systems consist of material things. Knowledge in an intelligent system that is also based on data. If we can translate the knowledge of simplicity into data, then we can introduce a simplicity into an intelligent system. If the intelligent computer can understand the unity of objects, that is, when it understands an object, it can distinguish it from the case it understands two or more objects, then it has understood numerical unity and can even understand a kind of unity and genus unity. Intelligent applications consider properties for each object. This is how they know things. By comparing these properties, it can categorize them and identify different types and goods.

It may be that intelligence systems do not recognize quality. However, these forms do not enter, either because an intelligent system also recognizes qualities by converting them into quantity. Colour is quality (and quantity if we speak about wavelength in nanometers), but an intelligent system detects colours much more accurately than humans. There have even been advances in odour detection. When the intelligent system can recognize quality and quantity and distinguish between them, knowledge has found the simple thing. It may be that what the intelligent system perceives its numerical data and does not recognize the concept of quantity and quality. In response, it should be said that the intelligent system can also recognize the concept of quantity and quality and uses them in comparison and that it does not compare colour with length.

Answer to Critique: It may be stated that perception is not done by the computer; computers cannot comprehend themselves and even numbers. It is man who, through the program given to the computer, enables the ‘functions’ of such operations for the computer, and the computer actually does not acquire this capability, and there is a great difference between functions and truth. An example of this is the difference between the action of ‘or’ in man and the action of ‘or’ in the gate of a logical circuit. The title operator is appropriately used here. Here, the ‘or’ gate has the function of ‘or’ without having an idea of the concept of ‘or’, but there is never any understanding of the concept of ‘or’.

Critique Answered: You are considering an ‘or’ operator here alone with the entire human system, and this is an incomplete comparison. Man can be a smart computer that perceives ‘or’ in all its complexity. This system should be compared to an intelligent system like that operating in the hotel management. It is difficult to accept that an intelligent human being like Ibn Sinā who died 1000 years ago would be resurrected in the present age, suddenly come in the mentioned hotel and distinguish humanoid robots from human beings when seeing them. The maximum thing is to say that some humans are less intelligent than other humans. Another example is the humanoid robot Sophia who acquired Saudi citizenship. The robot answered reporters' questions, and it was very difficult for those who did not already know to distinguish it from humans.

2.1.3. Consistency of forms of knowledge (mental imagery) despite changes in nerves and cells

Another argument given for the immortality of cognitive form is that since the cognitive form and change have no compromise with each other and the status of knowledge is different from the status of change and evolution, and given that material existence is the same as change, then the type of knowledge is different from that of matter. Allameh Tabataba'i cites the process of recollection to prove that knowledge has not changed and says: “Because of what we have perceived and re-perceived, the evidence in the latter case is the same as the first evidence itself, as well as what we perceived, then forgot or neglected and reconsidered, we remember the former; if in both cases, our evidence was not a real unit and did not have the survival stability that preserves objectivity, the realization of knowledge and remembrance was meaningless” [6, p. 104].

2.1.3.1. Critique

To illustrate such a perception in an intelligent system, we use the following example. Suppose my childhood photo is stored on an intelligent system with my profile. First, this image and profile may not change, even if the memory changes. This is evident in read-only memory as well as in random access memory by refreshing. As explained earlier, previous information is stored in the same memory location, and despite changes in the voltage of

memory cells, its contents remain the same. The brain can do the same, every cell that changes and gives way to another cell also transmits its information to it, and this is not surprising. Second, when an intelligent system reviews my profile, it finds out to what time the image and profile belong; what an intelligent system remembers is no longer an image, although it may store this reminder in memory. So, reminders also happen in an intelligent system.

Critique Answer: It may be said that this action is not called a reminder; otherwise, a photo that has fallen in a corner is being reminded every moment.

Criticism answered: A photo cannot make a comparison; however, the computer system compares the current image with previous images and draws conclusions accordingly. Very rare examples are attendance systems that compare the current fingerprint image with the image in their memory and recognize the person's presence or absence. You may say, as before, that this program was given by man to that machine, which is not a convincing answer.

2.1.4. Perception of continuous quantities

Another argument that Allameh Tabataba'i makes for the immortality of perception is the discernment of continuous quantities such as straight line, curved line, circle and surface [6, p. 101]. Understanding continuous quantities is among the perceptions that are obtained for the mind. In the definition of continuous quantity, it is usually stated that for the quantity whose components are interconnected such as line and surface, obviously it is not assumed that there is an actual component for continuous quantity and that there is no separation between them, but if we suppose two components of it, there is a common portion between them. Each continuous quantity such as a straight line, a curved line, a circle, and a surface has the extension and tension of a continuous unit. Because these elements are not in nature, they must exist in a container separate from matter.

2.1.4.1. Critique

This argument also does not imply the immortality of knowledge since what we perceive such as line, surface, circle, and so forth can be due to our perceptual weakness. Just as we see a spinning wheel in a continuous circle when we rotate it, this vision is because the effect of the image remains in the eye for a few milliseconds, and we cannot see discrete points. If our eyes did not have this property, we could see the movement of the wheel as it is. This is the weakness of our perception, not the immortality of perception. In addition, an intelligent system understands such images, and all the calculations it performs are based on it.

In an intelligent system, everything is stored in binary form and nothing is perceived continuously. For example, it is stored for the coordinate circle of the centre and several points of its perimeter. The number of points can be very

large but not all parts of the circle are recorded. In addition, it is not necessary to store a large number of points. Now, does man understand the continuous line in this way? That is, the registration of information is discrete. As man has little power, he sees what he has understood continuously.

For further clarification, consider two light sources that are far away from us. We see the two together. When we approach these two sources, we distinguish them as two sources. Therefore, constantly seeing the continuous line is due to our perceptual weakness, not the immortality of perception. If our senses were very precise, we would not see objects continuously.

2.1.5. Perception of universal ideas

One of the arguments that Allameh Tabataba'i has made for the immortality of perception is the perception of universal ideas that have no material properties. Allameh says: "The universal ideas are coincidence with a series of attributes and properties that are absent in matter, although at the same time they somehow adapt to matter, similar to the concept of general man that applies to every instance of human. However, in matter, we do not have a human being who is applicable to everyone since every human being is a person not applicable to anyone other than himself. These meanings are all general, fixed and absolute, and in the material world, we do not have a being with these attributes, and everything is personal, variable and constrained. Therefore, this series of evidences should also be considered as abstract from the matter." [6, p. 103]

Ibn Sinā has stated this reason in *al-Mubāathāt* (المباحثات) and has considered it as the best reason for the immortality of soul [12]. In the mentioned book, his disciples have made many objections to this argument, and he has answered them all. Mullā Ṣadrā says in the eighth volume of *Asfār*: Ibn Sinā's students, who were often away from him, usually asked Ibn Sinā about scientific matters and philosophical problems in correspondence and he answered their questions, and I gathered all his objections and answers, which were scattered.

The argument is as follow. The human soul can conceive of universal ideas such as the concept of general human being, which is common to all individuals and applicable to all of them. The whole human being is detached from a certain state and form since if it has a certain shape and form, it will not be applicable to other people having a certain shape and form. This general form, which is abstract from matter, exists, and it is not extinct. It is clear that the universal idea does not exist outside of mind, so it exists in the mind. The location of this creature is either a body like the brain, or a single creature called the soul. The first case is void, since if the universal idea dissolves in the body, then the body will have a certain quantity and state, so it will be single in the soul [4, p. 364].

What is an universal idea? Philosophers before Mullā Ṣadrā used to say that the universal idea is in the form of 'analysis', that is, the mind first understands the particular ideas and then discards the differences in all, and the rest becomes the general concept. They give examples of coins with different patterns that if we count those coins, in the end they are all of one type that cannot be distinguished. Mullā Ṣadrā considered universal idea to have different emanations; man has imagination, intellect and senses emanations (or dimensions). The levels of perception are arranged from sense to intellect, and sensory perception becomes imaginary perception and subsequently intellect perception. Rational existence is so vast that it includes many instances. In this view, the particular idea is exalted, goes higher and higher and becomes general, and if it becomes general, it is not the one that is reduced [6, p. 280-281].

On the other hand, there are two general types.

2.1.5.1. Critique

There are many problems with this argument. Herewith, some of them that are somehow related to the discussion are presented. The universal idea of human nature used in our reason is either existent or extinct. If it is extinct, it would be futile to argue that its location is physical or non-physical. If it exists, then it is a personal and definite form, which is present within a certain soul [4, p. 364].

Mullā Ṣadrā opposes the opinion of Islamic philosopher based on the theory of union of subject and object. They consider the perception of objects as the indwelling of the form of objects in the soul. However, Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the mental form indwelling in the soul is not the case. In his view, the rational form for things is in the form of subsistence of issuing. Therefore, the rational form of substance is an independent substance that is inherent in the essence of the wise substance. This form is in terms of the essence, sanctity and atom of people who exist outside the mind because the external existence (not in mind) of these people requires the presence of matter that is always subject to change and transformation.

If we accept the revolt of the issuance of rational forms to the soul as well as the independent essence of the rational substance in existence, we must accept it for all rationales. Here, there are some problems as follows.

One of the concepts is that human being's reason is the obligatory partner of existence, which is a general concept. However, the obligatory partner does not exist at all and it is not possible.

Another concept is that of obligatory existence. This is also a general concept. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, this concept exists and has subsistence of issuing to soul. While the obligatory cannot have subsistence of issuing.

Another problem is related to formal concepts. Formal perceptions are the opposite of real perceptions, which are mental developments and reflections of reality. Nevertheless, formal perceptions are hypotheses that the mind has made

in order to meet vital needs with a status, contractual, hypothetical and formal aspect and has nothing to do with reality [13]. The most important problem of this argument is that most people cannot imagine general concepts [5, vol. 8, p. 268].

Even if all people can imagine general concepts, this reason still does not work in the immortality of the soul since this structure does not accept the transcendent part because it is based on the immortality of perception. Artificial intelligence agents can also have a slightly degraded (obscured) perception of the general concept. The artificial intelligence agent can compare different images stored in memory, extract their commonalities and create another image that is compatible with each of those previous images and thus with their external instances. Suppose the artificial intelligence sees images of crows, pigeons, helicopters and planes in the sky. Based on their movements, it can extract properties for them. For example, for each size, it stores the speed and physical properties as well as the environment in its memory. For each, it acquires the property of moving in the air, which is the same as flying.

It is not difficult to develop such a program, and I myself have participated in a project for such a work that has given good results, and obviously research in this field is ongoing. However, we can consider man as a complex computer, and artificial intelligence research continues to create concepts.

2.2. Proof of immortality of soul based on specific human characteristics

Some of the arguments that have been made about the immortality of soul are based on human characteristics, which are examined in the continuation of these types of arguments.

2.2.1. Self-awareness of the soul

One of Allameh Tabataba'i's arguments for immortality of soul is based on his perception [6, p. 118]. Self-awareness means that everyone is aware of their own existence, which means that everybody recognizes himself as an independent being superior to other beings. This existence cannot be material, so it must be abstract from matter.

In the proof of major of a syllogism, said the following statement has been made. We can rationalize our essences, and whoever rationalizes the essence, the quiddity of that essence is for him, so the quiddity of our essences is for us. Therefore, either we rationalize our essence in the sense that another form of our essence which is equal to our essence has been obtained in it, or that the essence of our essence is present in our mind. The first is impossible as it requires the union of similitude, so the second is proved. Moreover, whatever its essence is, it is self-subsistent for its own essence; therefore, the soul is a non-physical substance because everything that is not physical is self-subsistence [14].

There is no doubt in the minority, we cannot find one who does not detect himself and does not distinguish himself from other beings since man relates all his perceptions to himself and considers his attributes other than himself. I think, so I see. In addition, everyone recognizes that he is a person in the past and present, and hence does not need to remember the memories of the past [6, p. 145-146]. This is not a property of matter, so I is something other than matter and abstract.

2.2.1.1. Critique

If we take perception to mean that I am who I am, this is the case with man. An intelligent system can also perceive itself regardless of the environment.

Each intelligent system is programmed to start executing commands from a specific address when it starts. With any data coming from outside the intelligent system through the inputs, it realizes that something special has happened outside and reacts to it. Controllers are an example of this type of intelligent system. One of such controllers is optical radar, in which two cameras are connected to an intelligent system that can cover the environment and react to external changes. For example, it can track the aircraft in sight and even identify the type of aircraft, its speed, direction and position, and whether it belongs to the enemy or not. In fact, it realizes that it belongs to outside. The intelligent system also sees itself as a unit and never equates itself with other things. In addition, it does not require a reminder of the past to identify itself.

Response to criticism: This action is not called self-knowledge.

Response to Criticism Response: What is meant by self-knowledge? Before that, it must be determined what itself is. What unites human behaviour and which is the main factor in the unity of human behaviour? In response to this question, Parvin introduces his concept [15]. The term is used in six senses: a) self means the agent or force of doing work; b) self as an internal witness to events; c) self means the totality of personal experience; d) self as a whole personally organized; e) self means self-awareness, awareness and perception; f) self means abstract purpose.

Considering each of the above meanings, it has a material application in the computer. It is clear that a computer program to perform certain actions has the agent or power to do things. It monitors and witnesses the events that take place (in order to be aware). The third and fourth meanings are also something that, if one understands them, are conceivable in the computer, and if it means an abstract concept, it is out of question. The fifth meaning is also true in the computer since it is aware of its activities and is aware of its being. In the computer, the command is performed as follows.

Each command consists of several sub-instructions. The central processing unit executes them in a specific order. Execution of this command includes access to memory to remove the command, namely execution of the

command, which can include reading from input, writing to output devices, and storing information in memory. During the execution of these instructions, the computer can assess its health and issue instructions accordingly. In the event that the central processing unit fails, the computer's self-consciousness is also destroyed, and this is equivalent to the failure of human brain so that human beings can no longer perceive themselves.

2.2.2. *Do not neglect yourself*

We are sometimes oblivious to every part of our body and sometimes to all of it; however, we never neglect what we mean by my word [16]. Allameh says in *Usul-i falsafeh va ravesh-e-realism* (The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism): "Each of us (as experience and evidence show, other living beings do the same) is aware of ourselves and observes that it is something not applicable to any organ or organ's properties since it does not differ by the excess and deficiency of the limbs and does not change with the difference between the ages of life and the depletion of forces; rather, it becomes more complete and clear, and sometimes one or more limbs and sometimes the whole body are forgotten but not the self. He observes that from the moment he can recall his past days and yet remind himself intuitively, he notes that this reminder is often accompanied by remembering a series of actions or events that are time-consuming; otherwise, it can be seen that it is not adaptable to time, even in terms of imagination. This statement concludes that science itself is not material, and above all, it infers that the soul itself is knowledge of itself, that is, the reality of science and the known reality of the soul are one, and it is from here that philosophy calls this kind of perception knowledge. Presence is different from other perceptions and divides the absolute knowledge into acquired and present knowledge. [6, p. 121-124]

This argument consists of the following premise: a) it is impossible to neglect me; b) neglecting the body is possible; c) if the soul and the body were one, it was possible to neglect the body; therefore, the soul and the body should not be one thing.

2.2.2.1. Critique

Allameh Tabataba'i does not even consider the negligence of an unconscious person or sleep to violate this point. We know that when a person faints, he does not remember anything and seems to be unaware of himself. But Allameh answers that when a person becomes anesthetized and then regains consciousness, he does not remember his perception, not that he does not perceive his soul in a state of anaesthesia but cannot remember it, and the two are different [17].

Of course, I wish Allameh could explain how a person perceives himself in a state of anaesthesia. In addition, both premises of the argument need to be proven. When Allameh claims that he understands man in the state of anaesthesia, opponents may also claim that man also understands the body in that state.

2.2.3. Changing body cells and stabilizing the soul

Another argument used to prove immortality of soul is that the body's cells change several times over one's lifetime. One group dies and the other group takes its place. While everyone recognizes in person that he is a person [6, p. 107].

2.2.3.1. Critique

This does not indicate the immortality of the soul because the matter has the same property. Each cell that changes can, in a process, transfer its information to the next cell and unify human perception. However, man also understands his changes.

3. Conclusions

The difference in the way man exists has been debated among philosophers from long ago. Some philosophers consider man to be in two realms: a soul abstracted from matter and the material body. Other philosophers consider man to be one-dimensional, or regard him as composed of the soul or the body. The differences between the three groups have not been resolved after many years. Each group has argued in their favour and against the other group. Sometimes the advancement of Science was to the benefit of one group and to the detriment of another.

What we did in this study was a critique of Allameh Tabataba'i's most important rational reasons for immortality from the viewpoint of directors given the advances in artificial intelligence. Those who believe in the immortality of the soul say that man has properties that matter does not have, so man must be different from matter. But AI shows that many human characteristics can also be realized in matter.

Allameh's arguments are of the type of rational and narrative arguments, and rational reasons can be divided into two categories: a) arguments based on the immortality of perception and b) arguments based on specific human characteristics.

Today, computers and intelligent systems are the most important indication of the weakness of perceptual immortality. Artificial intelligence has also challenged evidence based on human characteristics, and other reasons must be sought to prove the existence of the soul and its immortality.

References

- [1] M.H. Tabatabai, *Bedayat al-Hekma*, Islamic publishing office affiliated with Qom seminary community of teachers, Qom, 1374 SH (1995), 68.
- [2] M.H. Tabatabai, *Nahayatol Hekma*, Vol. 2, Islamic Publishing Foundation, Qom, 1981, 353.
- [3] M.H. Tabatabai, *Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an*, Vol. 13, Islamic publishing office affiliated with Qom seminary community of teachers, Qom, 1417 AH (1997), 195.
- [4] F. al-Rāzī, *Almabaheth almasherqiat fi elm alelahiat wa altabieiat*, Vol. 2, Bidar Publication, Qom, 1411 AH (1991), 339-345.
- [5] Ş.a.-D.M. Shīrāzī, *Hikmat al-muta'aliya fi-l-asfar al-'aqliyya al-arba'a*, Vol. 1, Dar ihya' al turath al arabi, Beirut, 1981, 256.
- [6] M.H. Tabatabai, *The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism (With Motahari footnotes)*, Vol. 1, Sadra Publication, Qom, 1368 SH (1989), 93.
- [7] M. Iman Pour, *The Quarterly Journal of Philosophical Investigations*, **46(186)** (2003) 23-48.
- [8] H. Sabzavari, *Sharhe-Manzume*, M. Mohaghegh & T. Izutsu, (eds.), Tehran University, Tehran, 1369 SH (1990), 306.
- [9] H. Amoli, *Dorouse-Marefate-Nafs*, Vol. 1, Elmi-Farhangi Publication, Tehran, 1372 SH (1993), 116.
- [10] S.A. Ardebili, *Taqrirate falsafeh Imam Khomeini*, Vol. 3, The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, Tehran, 1385 SH (2006), 7.
- [11] M.S.M. Alavi Ameli, *Alaqat-altajryd*, H. Naji (ed.), Vol. 1, Association of Cultural Works and Honours, Tehran, 1381 SH (2002), 420.
- [12] M. Bīdārfar, *Discussions (al-Mubāḥathāt)*, Bidar, Qom, 1371 SH (1992).
- [13] M. Motahari, *Collection of works*, 7th edn., Vol. 6, Computer Research Center of Islamic Sciences, Qom, 1392 SH (2013), 372.
- [14] A.I.M. Ḥusaynī Ardakānī, *Mir'āt Al-Akwān (Description of the Hedayh of Mullah Sadra Shirazi)*, A. Nourani (ed.), Miras-Maktoob Publication, Tehran, 1375 SH (1996), 497.
- [15] L.A. Pervin, *Philos. Phenomen. Res.*, **34(3)** (1974) 307-330.
- [16] M.H. Tabataba'i, *The beginning of wisdom*, 14th edn., Islamic Propaganda Office of Qom Seminary, Qom, 1374 SH (1995), 139.
- [17] M.H. Tabataba'i, *Translation of Tafsir al-Mizan*, Vol. 6, Allameh Tabatabai Scientific and Intellectual Foundation, Qom, 1371 SH (1992), 179-180.